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the insured from liability for that amount due claimants in excess of the
obligation of the insurer.
7. The proportionate distribution of the insurance fund shall not re-
lieve the insurer from his duty to defend all suits against the insured,
when the policy of insurance so provides.
The writer feels that this addition to our insurance law will bring
North Carolina one step closer to better protection of innocent parties
from the irresponsible motorist and to realization of equality for all.
BENJAMIN S. MARKS, JR.
Insurance-Soliciting Agent-Waiver of Initial Policy Provisions
In the case of Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Gurley,"
recently before the Fourth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals,
the court was faced with the question of whether a valid insurance con-
tract bad come into existence. The applicant had made application2 for
a plan of life insurance calling for a $99.00 quarterly premium. The
premium was paid at the time of application and a receipt3 given. A
policy of the plan applied for was issued, but at a quarterly premium of
$122.00, the applicant having been given a "Class B" rate. The appli-
cant refused to pay the premium increase or accept the policy, and re-
quested the local agent to get the policy issued at the standard rate.4
1229 F. 2d 326 (4th Cir. 1956). The district court decision appears in 132 F.
Supp. 289 (1955).
'The application was signed by the applicant and stated in part, "3) With the ex-
ception of officers of the Company, notice to or knowledge of the agent, medical
examiner or any other person is not notice to or knowledge of the Company unless
stated in either Part A or B of this application, and none of such persons are
authorized to accept risks or pass upon insurability, nor shall any of such persons
have the power on behalf of the Company to make or modify any contract on behalf
of the Company or to waive any of the Companies rights or requirements." The
policy contained the following provision. "ENTIRE CONTRACT . . . only the
President, a Vice-President, Secretary, and Assistant Secretary, Actuary, or
Treasurer has power on behalf of the Company to make or modify this contract."
And on the back of the policy, "NOTICE TO POLICYHOLDERS . . . The
Company's agents have no authority to alter or amend the Policy, to accept
premiums in arrears, or to extend the due date of any premium."
'The receipt stated in part, "If this sum is equal to the first full premium on
the policy applied for then if the Company shall be satisfied that at the time of
completion of the medical examination or Part B of the application, if no medical
examination is required, that the risk was acceptable to the Company under its
rules, for the plan and amount of insurance herein applied for at the rate of premium,
declared paid, then the insurance shall be in force as of the date of completion of
the medical examination, or of Part B of the application if no medical examination
is required, but otherwise no insurance shall be in force under said application unless
and until a policy has been issued and delivered and the first full premium
stipulated in the policy has actually been paid to and accepted by the Company
during the lifetime and continued insurability of the applicant. The above sum
shall be refunded upon request if the application is declined or if the policy is issued
other than as applied for and is not accepted by the applicant."
'The district court record reveals that the applicant was at one time a life
insurance salesman. Transcript of Record, Page 20, 132 F. Supp. 289 (1955).
Question addressed to Tklrs. Gurley, wife of applicant. "Q. Mr. Gurley as a matter
of fact used to be a life insurance salesman? A. Yes, Sir."
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The policy was returned to the company, but was sent back to the agent
with the premium rate unchanged. The applicant, knowing the agent
was going to Greensboro, requested the agent to speak to company
officials. The company again refused to lower the premium rate. Upon
returning home the agent telephoned the applicant and informed him
of the companys' refusal. The applicant then stated that he would take
the policy as it was issued. Early the next morning the applicant died.5
The policy had not been delivered nor had the premium increase been
paid.
The case, by virtue of the Erie Doctrine,6 was based on North Caro-
lina law. The circuit court ruled that a valid insurance contract had
come into existence once the applicant had verbally accepted the policy,
and held the company liable. In the course of its decision the court
stated, "Apparently, a soliciting agent, in North Carolina, has the power
to waive certain written conditions and requirements connected with
the inception of the insurance contract and the payment of the first
premium, though not as to subsequent premiums nor as to the
coverage of the policy.'' 7 As authority for this statement the circuit
court cites the North Carolina cases of Foscue v. Greensboro Mutual Life
Ins. co. 8 and Burch v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co.9
It is settled law in North Carolina that the local agent of a life
insurance company is a soliciting agent' ° rather than a general agent."'
The importance of the local life insurance agent today would warrant a
close inspection of the North Carolina cases, and especially the circuit
court's interpretation of the Foscue and Burch cases, involving the ques-
tion of the power of such an agent to waive premium payments contrary
to his authority as stated in the policy and application.
The applicant died on September 18, 1952. The Transcript of Record Page
16 132 F. Supp. 289 (1955) reveals that on September 16, 1952, one day prior to
the applicant's verbal acceptance, applicant consulted a doctor, was given a
cardiogram, and advised, "To stay at home for a few days and see how he would
feel."
Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
1 Life and Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. Gurley, 229 F. 2d 326, 330 (4th Cir.
1956). This case also involves interesting questions on constructive delivery, what
acts constitute waiver by agent or company, and delivery in good health. This note
Will be limited to the question of the agent's power to waive premium payments.
8196 N. C. 139, 144 S. E. 689 (1928).
p201 N. C. 720, 161 S. E. 313 (1931).
1016 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE Sec. 8696 (1945), "A general
agent ordinarily passes on risks, issues policies, and may vary the terms of the
written contract. A soliciting agent, on the other hand, merely procures application,
forwards them to the home office, collects premiums, delivers policies, and is with-
out authority to issue policies." See also 29 Am. Jua. Insurance Sec. 96 (1940)
44 C. J. S. Insurance Sec. 152 (1945).
"Hicks v. Home Security Life Ins. Co. 226 N. C. 614, 39 S. E. 2d 914 (1946);
Jones v. Gates City Life Ins. Co. 216 N. C. 300, 4 S E. 2d 848 (1939) ; North
Carolina Bank and Trust Co. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co. 206 N. C. 460, 174 S. E. 289




In the Foscue case, the insured had taken out an accident insurance
policy with the defendant in 1925. The policy called for a monthly
premium of $3.40, paid in advance, and stated that the agent did not have
authority to extend the time of premium payments. The insured was
unable to pay the premium due in August, 1926. Defendant's agent told
the insured that if he would take out another policy he, the agent, would
extend the time of payment of the premium on the accident policy until
the insured's next pay day. The insured was accidently killed, the
premium on the accident policy not having been paid up to his death.
The court, in holding that the insurance company was not liable on
the accident policy, stated that waiver could be established by: (1) ex-
press agreement, (2) conduct or a course of dealings, or (3) ratification.
The decision makes it clear that the acts which constitute the waiver must
be acts of the company, not of the agent.12 The agent cannot, by his
own acts, enlarge his power beyond that stated in the policy. The
binding effect of the non-waiver provision in the policy was again indi-
cated when the court took notice of the fact that the agent was not an
officer of the company, but only a local agent for selling insurance and
collecting premiums. Under the non-waiver provision, only executive
officers of the company were permitted to change the policy. The only
mention of the local agent's power to waive conditions at the inception
of the contract, which would include the first premium, was by way of
dictum. The court stated, "The restrictions inserted in the contract upon
the powers of the agent to waive any conditions unless done in a par-
ticular manner cannot be deemed to apply to those conditions which relate
to the inception of the contract when it appears that the agent has
delivered the policy and accepted the premium with full knowledge of the
situation."'Is The authority for this dictum is a case involving the
general agent of a fire insurance company.14 The court thus applies a
principle of law developed in a case concerning a general agent to a case
dealing with a soliciting agent.
In the Burch case, the insured had taken out a policy with the de-
fendant in 1923 covering accidental death by automobile. The insured
failed to pay the premium due July 17, 1929, and was killed in an auto-
mobile accident on July 31, 1929. There was evidence to the effect that
defendant's agent had, in the past, extended the time of premium pay-
ments and accepted payment beyond the due date. The plaintiff, by this
evidence, was attempting to establish a course of dealings and thereby
show waiver by the agent of the condition in the policy calling for pre-
" Foscue v. Greensboro Mutual Life Ins. Co., 196 N. C. 139, 141, 144 S. E.
689, 690 (1928), "The powers of the agent as expressed in the policy may be en-
larged by usage of the Company, its course of business, or by its consent, express
or implied."
13 Ibid.
" Johnson v. Rhode Island Ins. Co. 172 N. C. 142, 90 S. E. 124 (1916).
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payment of premiums. The agent was engaged in the general insurance
business, selling automobile liability, accident, health and fire insurance.
It is not clear whether the agent was acting as a general or soliciting
agent. The court denied the plaintiff's claim, holding that even though
a course of dealings between the agent and insured can be shown, it is
necessary to prove that the defendant company had knowledge of such
dealings. 15 The court pointed out that to establish waiver by ratification,
the ratification must be by the defendant company, not by the agent.
Again, the only comment of the court concerning agreements made by
the agent at the inception of the contract was by way of dictum. The
court states: "At the outset it must be borne in mind that there is a vital
and fundamental distinction between liability arising from agreements
made by the agent of an insurance company at the inception of the
contract and that arising from agreements made by the agent with the
insured after the contract has taken effect, resulting in the modification
of the terms and conditions of the written engagement of the parties."' 0
The authority cited for this dictum is the Foscue case.
Summarizing the Foscue and Burch cases, both deal with the question
of an insurance agent's power to waive conditions subsequent to the ex-
istence of a binding insurance contract; in both cases the only mention
of an insurance agent's power to waive conditions at the inception of the
contract is by way of dicta and the authority for the dicta is a case
involving a general agent of a fire insurance company; and lastly, in
only one of the cases is it clear that the agent is a soliciting agent of a
life insurance company.
From the foregoing dicta it might appear that should the question of
a life insurance soliciting agent's power to waive conditions at the incep-
tion of the contract and particularly pre-payment of the first premium,
ever come before the North Carolina court, the court would follow the
dicta in the Foscue and Burch cases. That such a result would not be
reached is indicated by the case of North Carolina Bank and Trust v.
Pilot Life Ins. Co.,' 7 in which the soliciting agent of the defendant had
delivered the policy to the insured for inspection. The premium had
not been paid and the agent made it clear that the policy would not be in
effect until payment of the premium. When applicant died, he still
possessed the policy but had never paid the premium. The court denied
the plaintiff's claim, posing itself the following question: Can a soliciting
" Burch v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 201 N. C. 720, 724, 161 S. E.
313, 315 (1931), "It is contended that the evidence discloses a course of dealings
between the insured and the agent of the insurer with respect to the payment of the
premium, but there is no evidence that the defendant Company had knowledge of
such course of dealings other than such knowledge as would be imputed to it through
its local agent, nor is there evidence of ratification, as defined by law, on the part
of the defendant."18Id. at 722, 161 S. E. at 314.t7206 N. C. 460, 174 S. E. 289 (1934).
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agent for a life insurance company deliver a policy and waive payment
of the first premium or extend credit for the payment thereof when both
the application and policy provide that the contract of insurance shall
not become effective until the first premium has been paid; and further
that only executive officers as specified shall have power to alter or modify
the contract ?18 (Emphasis added.)
In answering this question, the court cites the Foscue and Burch cases
and states: "Both of these cases hold that the local or soliciting agents,
as such, have no authority to extend credit to the insured or to waive
the premium provided in the policy or extend the time of payment
thereof." 19
Thus, the North Carolina court either ignores or differently interprets
its previous dicta, and comes to a conclusion diametrically opposed to
the circuit court in its interpretation of the same two cases.
Considering the Foscue and Burch cases involving waiver of premi-
ums subsequent to a binding contract, in conjunction with the Bank and
Trust Co. case involving waiver of the first premium, it would seem
that the North Carolina court intends to treat the power of a soliciting
agent to waive first or a subsequent premium the same; i.e., a soliciting
agent does not have the power to waive payments or extend the time of
payment of premiums contrary to the terms of the policy.
A further indication that the North Carolina court will, in the future,
hold that a soliciting agent cannot waive payments as prohibited in the
policy is found in the North Carolina court's citation in the Bank and
Trust Co. case of Curtis'v. Prudential Co. of America.20
This case was decided by the fourth circuit and arose in North Caro-
lina, but since it was decided prior to the Erie Railroad Co. case, was not
based on North Carolina law and was not binding on the circuit court
in the Gurley case. The facts of the Curtis and Gurley cases are very
much the same. In the Curtis case, the insured had paid almost half of
the first quarterly premium. On the day prior to the insured's death,
the beneficiary offered to pay the remaining premium but defendant's
soliciting agent told her it was not necessary, that the policy was in force
for another month. The policy had never been delivered. The circuit
court refused to hold the insurance company liable, giving binding effect
to the provisions in the policy that the policy would not be effective until
delivery and payment of the premium. The court said, "The provisions
that a policy of life insurance shall not take effect unless the first premium
is actually paid during the lifetime of the person insured, is valid and will
be enforced according to its terms."'2' To support its position, the court
cites a North Carolina case.22
Is Id. at 463, 174 S. E. at 300. "Ibid.20 55 F. 2d 97 (4th Cir. 1932). "Id. at 99.
"Sturgill v. Nev York Life Ins. Co., 195 N. C. 34, 141 S. E. 280 (1928).
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At the time, the fourth circuit court defended the result thusly:
"We believe this to be a wholesome rule, because it is clearly ap-
parent that the business of life insurance, which is too important a
part of our civilization in this latter-day world, could not be
carried on were the insurance companies bound by every act or
statement of a local agent; especially one whose duty is mainly
that of soliciting or collecting. If it were otherwise, great in-
justice would follow, and a great loss be imposed upon holders of
life insurance policies, because of the increased burden upon the
companies that would result. While the courts are careful, in
every way, to protect the interests of beneficiaries under insurance
policies, yet there is a limit which should not be exceeded. The
reasonableness of the respective contentions should be the yard-
stick with which to measure the justice of the matter. '28
Whether the North Carolina court will now interpret its decisions
and dicta as the fourth circuit court of appeals did in the instant case, or
will continue to enforce the insurance contract as written, remains to be
seen. To the writer it seems that the policy announced by the court in
the Curtis case is patently sound.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR
Labor Law-Right to Distribute Union Literature on Company
Property
In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.," the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the National Labor Relations Board in three
cases2 and held that union organizers who are nonemployees do not
have the right to distribute union literature on company property where
there are other means of communicating with the workers available to the
union and there has been no discrimination by the company.
The opinion handed down by Mr. Justice Reed for a unanimous Court
said: "The Act requires only that the employer refrain from inter-
ference, discrimination, restraint or coercion in the employees' exercise
of their own rights. It does not require that the employer permit the
use of its facilities for organization when other means are readily
available."3
The plants, in all three cases, were located within one mile of the
23 55 F. 2d 97, 99 (1932).
'351 U. S. 105 (1956).
2 Babcock & Wilcox Co., 109 N. L. R. B. 485 (1954), enforcement denied, 222
F. 2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), affd, 351 U. S. 105 (1956) ; Ranco, Inc., 109 N. L. R. B.
998 (1954), enforcement granted, 222 F. 2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955), rev'd ub nona.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956); Seamprufe, Inc.,
109 N. L. R. B. 24 (1954), enforcement denied, 222 F. 2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955),
iuff'd sub norn. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956).
'NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105, 113-14 (1956).
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